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Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal
Facility Sitings: Negotiating a Role for the Public
I. INTRODUCTION
Citizens' fears of radioactive waste hazards coupled with public
distrust of the nuclear industry influence construction of radioactive
waste disposal facilities and are partially responsible for present shortages
of storage space.' Since activities producing low-level radioactive waste
provide many necessary services, particularly in medicine and industry,
public fears must be ameliorated to allow operation of adequate facilities
for waste disposal.
Difficulties characteristic of all types of waste disposal facility sitings
are especially apparent in attempts to site low-level radioactive waste
facilities. These difficulties make alternative dispute mechanisms useful
in resolving many conflicts. Radioactive waste sitings, in particular, are
greatly influenced by the public's knowledge of past failures in waste
facility sitings. Furthermore, low-level radioactive waste facility sitings
create unique dilemmas for mediation as the technical complexity of
the disposal process and the controversiality of nuclear activities combine
to impede the effectiveness of public participation required for advan-
tageous facility siting decisions.
Since technology's effect on public participation in the low-level
radioactive waste facility siting process is significant, this Note will
discuss the implications of science and technology in such sitings.
Potential avenues for improving public participation in facility sitings
will be discussed as well, including the Citizens Board and Science
Court.2 In conclusion, this Note recommends implementation of a Ne-
gotiation-based Facility Siting Process as a procedure which would
enhance the effectiveness of public participation in the low-level radio-
active waste facility siting process.
II. THE LoW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DILEMMA
A. A Temporal Crisis
Low-level radioactive waste production in the United States is cur-
rently leveling off. This reinforces the misconception that current waste
production levels will remain stable. Attempts to site facilities are then
1. See generally Tarlock, Anywhere But Here: An Introduction to State Control of
Hazardous Waste Facility Location, 2 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL' Y 11, 21-22 (1981);
Rea, Hazardous Waste Pollution: The Need for a Different Statutory Approach, 12
ENVTL. L. 443 (1982).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 93-105 discussing the Citizens Board and Science
Court as alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
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thwarted by this false impression that current facilities provide adequate
storage space.3 The consequences are costly and dangerous.
Two-hundred million medical procedures performed every year gen-
erate low-level radioactive wastes.4 However, medical researchers and
experts on radiation and health warn that if negotiations to establish
disposal facilities continue to drag, better health care at a reasonable
cost will be sabotaged in two respects: (1) radioactive materials necessary
for health care may not be produced because of the lack of storage,
and; (2) those materials that are produced will become prohibitively
expensive.5
The storage space shortage has other adverse consequences. By the
year 2000, twelve commercial reactors may require decommissioning-
the process of closing down a nuclear power plant in a way that prevents
public access to the plant and prevents dispersion of radioactive materials. 6
Since decommissioning significantly increases low-level radioactive
waste generation, storage needs for this waste will increase far beyond
present facilities. Therefore, the low-level radioactive waste problem
must be resolved quickly through innovative alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms. These mechanisms will improve public participation by
recognizing both the nature of environmental disputes in general and
the uniquely ideological conflicts accompanying nuclear-related policy
decisions.
B. The Nature of Environmental Disputes and the Recent Shift in
Public Opinion
Understanding the general nature of environmental disputes requires
a recognition of past public perceptions of man's role within the envi-
ronment. In the nineteenth century, Americans adhered to a biblical
view of man's dominance over nature, manifesting this orientation in
extensive and destructive exploitation of natural resources. 7 However,
in the twentieth century, a shift occurred in the public's perceptions of
environmental issues. The "manifest destiny" and expansionary philo-
sophies of the 1800's dissipated. The twentieth century also brought
with it realization of the need for both land development and preservation.
In the 1970's, environmental concerns achieved their current prominence
3. H.R. REP. No. 314 pt. 2, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (99 Stat.) 3002, 3005.
4. Id.
5. PRESIDENT & FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE, THE HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL
HEALTH LETrEr,, Not in My Back Yard: Low-Level Radioactive Waste and Health, (1986),
excerpted in 2 MIDWEST INTERSTATE Low-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE COMMISSION
UPDATE 2 (Oct. 1986).
6. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, A NUCLEAR WASTE PRIMER 17 (1980).
7. S. MERNITZ, MEDIATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A SOURCEBOOK 3-5 (1980).
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and the environment became a protected entity.' Justice Douglas' dissent
in Sierra Club v. Morton9 reflected this change, "Contemporary public
concern for protecting nature's ecological equilibrium should lead to the
conferral of standing upon environmental objects to sue for their own
preservation."'l0
The shift in public opinion referred to in Justice Douglas' dissent
had varied causes. First, the shift was created by the uniquely long-
term and cumulative effects of environmental harms." Public opinion
changed as harms became more fully appreciated in the last twenty
years. 12 Second, social values changed in the 1960's as anti-establishment
impulses dominated. 3 Third, legal and political institutions developed
innovative environmental remedies as solutions to natural resource
conflicts. 14
Although this shift in public opinion demonstrates the diverse nature
of environmental conflict in general, the traditional diversity exemplifying
environmental views is most apparent in the nuclear waste disposal
dilemma. Conflicts plaguing facility sitings for low-level radioactive waste
arise from technological uncertainty, public aversion to locally sited
facilities, and ego-centric economic cost/benefit analyses.
C. Sources of Environmental Conflict Regarding Nuclear Wastes
1. Technological Uncertainties. Public opinion conflicts found in
environmental issues are intensified in low-level radioactive wastes con-
flicts because of the technical nature of nuclear waste generating ac-
tivities. The uncertainties which scientists, lawmakers, and the public
must contend with are debilitating, "The courts have been continually
baffled by adversary proceedings in which scientific experts from one
side refute claims of experts from the other side."' 15 Consequently,
understanding and mitigating the many misconceptions pervading reg-
ulation of low-level radioactive wastes first requires an understanding
of the nature of radioactive wastes.
Public uncertainty results from the tendency to confuse low-level and
high-level radioactive wastes.' 6 The major distinction made by the public
8. Id.
9. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
10. Id. at 741-42.
11. L. BACOW & M. WHEELER, ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1 (1984).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2.
14. Id.
15. S. MERNITZ, supra note 7, at 8.
16. High-level waste refers to reactor fuel, liquid wastes from nuclear reactor operations
cycles, and the solids into which liquid wastes have been converted. Most high-level
radiactive waste in the United States is generated by nuclear power plants. Low-level
radioactive wastes are generated in almost all activities using radioactive materials. These
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between high and low-level radioactive wastes, relevant to disposal
problems, is in the amount and toxicity of the waste. High and low-
level radioactive wastes are distinguishable by the varied degree of
hazard each produces and the time required to eliminate adverse affects.
7
High-level radioactive wastes must be isolated for thousands to tens of
thousands of years, while low-level radioactive wastes must be isolated
for a period of fifty to five hundred years. 18 Additionally, the amounts
of wastes differ. The volume of high-level wastes, 250 million cubic
yards generated yearly, greatly exceeds the 2.5-3.0 million cubic feet
of low-level radioactive wastes disposed of annually in the United States.'9
Even though some estimates show that deterioration of most low-level
radioactive wastes to safe levels of radioactivity will occur within twenty
to thirty years, the definition of "safe" remains highly controversial and
much of the debate concerning radioactive waste centers around the
scientific uncertainty that characterizes both the time factors and the
biological risks of radiation. 0
wastes are defined by what they are: "material which has been contaminated by radioactive
elements or radionuclides;" and by what they are not: spent reactor fuel, wastes from
reprocessed reactor fuel, uranium mine, and mill tailings. Their physical form varies from
gaseous effluents and processing solutions, to contaminated protective clothing, needles,
test tubes, and other research materials. Utility companies are the major source of low-
level wastes producing approximately 64% of the wastes. However, medical research and
services, and industries serving the medical community account for nearly 28% of low-
level radioactive wastes. Finally, academic institutions produce three percent and the
federal government two percent of low-level radioactive wastes generated in the United
States. For a concise explanation of nuclear concepts, see ROLPH, NUCLEAR POWER AND
THE PUBLIC SAFETY: A STUDY IN REGULATION, "Appendix C- Technical Notes: Basic
Nuclear Concepts," 189-200 (1979).
17. The degree of hazard produced depends on the "half-life" of the radioactive waste.
Half-life is the time it takes for the material's radioactivity to be reduced by half. Emission
of alpha and beta particles determine the half-life. The following effects of radiation are
discussed in LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 6, at 23-25. (A rem measures the
amount of damage to human tissue from a dose of ionizing radiation. To be immediately
lethal, radiation exposure to the body must exceed 1,000 rems over a brief period-
minutes or hours, as at the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. In the range from 500-
1,000 reins, radiation sickness occurs which can result in death. However, low-level radiation
creates cell damages. The type of cell affected determines the amount of damage. Damage
to an ordinary cell (bone tissue of flesh) confines injury to that organism. This is somatic
damage possibly resulting in cancer or leukemia. However, if a reproductive cell is
damaged, mutations may occur. For both types of damage, the latency period-the time
between exposure and effect-is long for cancer, 25 years, and a generation or more for
genetic damage.)
18. Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission Regional Manage-
ment Plan, Summary Report 6 (Aug. 1, 1986) [hereinafter MIDWEST SUMMARY REPORT].
19. Id.
20. Kearney & Stucker, Interstate Compacts and the Management of Low-Level
Radioactive Wastes, 45 PUB. AD. REv. 210, 214 (1985). For a general discussion of risks
of nuclear power plant-generated radioactive wastes, see Schulze, Brookshire & Sandier,
The Social Rate of Discount for Nuclear Waste Storage: Economics or Ethics?, 21
NATURAL RESOURCES J. 811, 812-14 (1981). See also Burness, Risk. Accounting for an
Uncertain Future, 21 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 723, 725-30 (1981).
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Distorted perceptions of the risks of nuclear power plants and ra-
dioactive waste disposal facilities result from complex and contradictory
information promulgated by both the government and the scientific
community. 21 For example, since 1957, when the federal government
began setting standards for acceptable radiation dosages, standards have
been steadily revised downward, based in part on the fact that "risk
estimates for low levels of radiation are based on incomplete data and
involve a large degree of uncertainty. '"22
Siting hazardous waste facilities involves debates in which "technical
arguments can be found to support or refute any conclusion offered. '23
Furthermore, technology may be used to increase this uncertainty by
its tendency to obscure value decisions through purposeful emphasis on
technical information and by inadvertent disorientation shrouded in
technical complexity. 24 Finally, technological complexity unavoidably
complicates facility siting decisions as it intensifies local opposition to
hazardous waste disposal facilities.25
2. Local Opposition to Facility Sitings. The tension between local
concerns for health and safety and national concerns for economic and
scientific progress exacerbates existing conflicts. Local opposition to
waste facilities is reflected by the familiar acronym, "NIMBY"-not-
in-my-back-yard. 26 Additionally, the public takes an egocentric view of
radioactive waste risks because disadvantages of storage facilities are
disproportionately concentrated in the locality where the facility is built.
Although burdens are localized, benefits are spread over an entire state,
or in the case of low-level radioactive waste, an entire interstate compact
region.27 Therefore, public aversion to hazardous waste facilities is
rational and more difficult to combat.
3. Judicial Balancing of Interests. The final source of environmental
conflict is within the courts' weighing of interests. The Minnesota District
Court in United States v. Reserve Mining emphasized that "[a]ny
21. See infra text accompanying notes 92-105 discussing the Citizens Board and
Science Court as alternative dispute resolution mechanisms which may provide a solution
to this dilemma.
22. D. MORELL & C. MAGORIAN, SITING HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES: LOCAL
OPPOSITION AND THE MYTH OF PREEMPTION 24 (1982).
23. Id. at 64.
24. Susskind & Weinstein, Towards A Theory of Environmental Dispute Resolution,
9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 311, 319 (1980).
25. Bacow & Milkey, Overcoming Local Opposition to Hazardous Waste Facilities:
The Massachusetts Approach, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 265, 266-67 (1982).
26. See also Wolf, Public Opposition to Hazardous Waste Sites: The Self-Defeating
Approach to National Hazardous Waste Control Under Subtitle C of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 463, 524 n.284
(1980); S. MERNITZ, supra note 7, at 10.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 49-59.
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environmental litigation must involve a balancing of economic dislocation
with the environmental benefits. ' 28 The interests which must be weighed
by both courts and administrative agencies vary with changes in public
opinion and government policy. "Therefore, to the degree that it has
an obligation to protect the public's interest as it is defined by the
public, a regulatory agency must remain flexible and provide multiple
points of access. '29 The courts presently emphasize the environmental
interests reflected in land use and resource development legislation
promulgated by Congress in the early 1970's:
1. The law should value the quality of human life above economic
concerns;
2. The law should promote inanimate objects as living objects;
3. The law should balance environmental values against economic
values.30
In recent years, shifts in public views on environmental issues have
combined with drastic changes in public perceptions of nuclear power
and radioactive waste generating activities. The resulting public uneas-
iness has had an enormous impact on the siting of low-level radioactive
waste disposal facilities.
D. Nuclear Power and the Public Sentiment - A Nuclear Camelot
In 1954, nuclear energy was the knight on a white horse. Both the
scientific community and the press made "outspoken predictions about
the utopian benefits...of an energy source that would be 'too cheap to
meter."' 3' Opinion polls showed strong public support for the nuclear
power program, support which continued from the 1957 opening of the
first commercial nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania, to the end of the
1970's when seventy-one licensed commercial nuclear power reactors
provided 12.5% of all electricity used in the United States. 2
However, in the early 1970's, the anti-nuclear movement gained
momentum and by the 1980's the nuclear industry was in "virtual
paralysis. '33 Part of the decrease in public support resulted from the
industry and policy-makers' failure to maintain the cost-effectiveness of
28. United States v. Reserve Mining, 380 F. Supp. 11, 71 (D. Minn.), application to
vacate denied, 418 U.S. 911 (1974).
29. R. ASHLEY, NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR SITING 163 (1965).
30. S. MERNITZ, supra note 7, at 8-10.
31. Comment, Federal Supremacy Versus Legitimate State Interests in Nuclear Reg-
ulation: Pacific Gas & Electric and Silkwood, 33 CATH. U.L. REv. 899, 905 n.40 (1984)
citing Strauss, Remarks Prepared for Delivery at Founder's Day Dinner, National As-
sociation of Science Writers, New York City (Sept. 16, 1954) quoted in D. FORD, THE
CULT OF THE ATOM: THE SECRET PAPERS OFTHE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 50 (1982).
32. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 6, at 5.
33. Id.
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nuclear energy.3 4 Equally influential was a gap in the nuclear cycle
caused by the lack of a permanent waste disposal system. These factors
intensified the lack of confidence on the part of both nuclear plant
investors and the public resulting in a large "credibility gap. '35
This credibility gap also was created by the public's recognition of
the federal government's inability to effectively manage radioactive
wastes. Exemplified by the closing of most disposal facilities by the
early 1970's, the federal government's management failures were caused
by the policy-makers' sole reliance on exclusionary policies in controlling
radioactive waste disposal.
III. FEDERAL MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE
A. Exclusion Failures and the Origins of Concurrent Powers
The exclusionary role of the federal government in disposal of ra-
dioactive wastes was first asserted in 1946 when Congress created the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and delegated to that administrative
agency exclusive authority over the nuclear industry. 6 By 1971, the
AEC had six federally-operated sites for shallow land-based storage of
low-level radioactive wastes. However, most low-level radioactive waste
was disposed of at sea, a method of disposal still used by Great Britain
and France.37
Initially, most low-level radioactive waste was generated by the federal
government in defense related military operations.38 However, increased
civilian applications of nuclear technology increased the need for disposal
of commercially generated wastes. The importance of state cooperation
in establishing commercial sites became apparent as storage space
shortages developed.39
Recognizing the need to combat these early shortages, Congress
promulgated section 274 of the Atomic Energy Commission Amendments
of 1954 which integrated state action into regulation of radioactive waste
34. Id.
35. M. GREENBERG & R. ANDERSON, HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES: THE CREDIBILITY
GAP (1984).
36. In 1974, Congress abolished the Atomic Energy Commision and delegated its
powers to the Energy Research and Development Administration and the Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Agency. The Nuclear Regulatory Agency now regulates and licenses all commercial
nuclear activities, but is not responsible for licensing radioactive waste facilities. The
newly created Department of Energy absorbed the Energy Research and Development
Administration in 1977 and is now responsible for nuclear waste management, nuclear
research, and development. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 6, at 8-9.
37. Kearney & Stucker, supra note 20, at 214.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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disposal.40 Section 274 permitted states to regulate within the nuclear
energy field by allowing a state to make "turnover agreements" with
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. These agreements allowed states
to regulate low-level radioactive waste within state borders. 41
Taking advantage of section 274, Nevada opened the first commercial
low-level radioactive waste disposal facility in Beatty, Nevada in 1961.42
Within ten years, five additional sites opened in South Carolina, Wash-
ington, Kentucky, Illinois, and New York, but by 1978 three of the six
sites had been closed. 43
These closings demonstrate the failure of the federal government's
exclusionary policies as they resulted in inequitable distribution of the
burdens of waste disposal. Since nuclear technology and waste products
are concentrated in the eastern United States, South Carolina's facility,
as the only facility operating east of the Mississippi River, receives 80-
90% of all low-level radioactive waste produced in the United States. 44
In response, in 1979 the governors of those states hosting the three
remaining facilities announced that their states would be unwilling to
accept waste from outside their borders indefinitely. 45 Congress responded
by enacting the 1980 Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act (LLRW
Policy Act) mandating that states develop a system of regional disposal
sites for low-level radioactive waste.46
B. Principles and Provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Man-
agement Policy Act and Amendments
Passage of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act in 1980
followed years of congressional and presidential mismanagement of
nuclear waste disposal. Political and ideological conflicts prevented the
development of a legislative and executive consensus regarding a nuclear
waste management policy with specific goals.47 The LLRW Policy Act
was passed when it became increasingly apparent that legislative action
was necessary since the courts and administrative agencies were reluctant
to operate within the vacuum created by indecision at the federal level.48
40. 42 U.S.C. 2011-2296 (1976).
41. Note, The Role of Localities in the Transportation and Disposal of Nuclear
Wastes, 18 U. RICH. L. REv. 655, 663 (1984).
42. Kearney & Stucker, supra note 20, at 214.
43. See 1985 U.S. CODE & ADMIN. NEWS (99 Stat.) 3005.
44. Id. at 3006.
45. Id. at 3007.
46. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021c-d (West
Supp. 1987) [hereinafter LLRW Policy Act].
47. SENATE COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATuRAL REsouRCEs, LoW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE
WASTE POLICY ACT, S. REP. No. 548, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1980) reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6933, 6938.
48. Id. at 11, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (94 Stat.) 6934.
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Passage of the LLRW Policy Act also reflected the long-delayed
recognition by Congress of its inadequacies in disposing of low-level
radioactive waste.49 The Senate Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources Report published prior to passage of the Act affirmed the
timeliness of the legislation, "Given the lead times associated with site
selection, construction, environmental analysis and licensing...a need for
Federal action exists...to provide insurance against a storage shortfall
so that a critical shortage threatening reactor shutdowns will not occur
in the near future."50 Although the Act reflects congressional intent to
maintain control over radioactive waste disposal management, it also
emphasizes the realities of federal failures in waste disposal as the Act
breaks with traditional reliance on exclusionary control policies by
delegating limited authority to the states.
Recommending approval of the LLRW Policy Act, the Senate Report
emphasized the uniqueness of the radioactive waste problem: "Nuclear
waste presents problems we already have and will have no matter what
our national decision is with regard to nuclear power." 51 In attempting
to confront this highly complex and politically controversial problem
with policies of compromise and cooperation, the 1980 Act and the
subsequent 1985 Amendments prescribe a framework of interstate com-
pacts creating a national disposal system for low-level radioactive waste.
Three major principles are embodied in the Acts: (1) a state should be
responsible for disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within
its borders; (2) compact states should have the power to preclude non-
compact states from disposal of waste within their borders (provided
stated requirements are met); and (3) interstate compacts are the pre-
ferred framework for acceptance of such responsibility. 2
The first principle (individual state responsibilities) is reflected in
section 1 of the LLRW Policy Act. Section 1 delegates to each state
responsibility for disposing of all low-level radioactive wastes generated
within its borders, either within an in-state facility, or within an interstate
compact regional facility.5 3 The second principle (policy of preclusion)
is found in section 2021e of the Act, which, under specific circumstances,
allows a state to forbid other states from disposing of waste in a facility
within its borders.5 4 Reflecting the third principle, incentive mechanisms
are implemented encouraging states to fulfill their responsibilities in
49. Id. at 12, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (94 Stat.) 6938-
39.
50. Id. at 15, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (94 Stat.) 6938.
51. Id.
52. Kearney & Stucker, supra note 20, at 215-16.
53. 48 U.S.C.A. § 2021d(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
54. Id. at § 2021e(e)(2)(A)(ii).
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interstate compacts. The 1980 Act states "[a]fter January 1st, 1986,
any such compact may restrict the use of the regional disposal facilities
under the compact to the disposal of low-level radioactive wastes gen-
erated within the region."55
The 1985 Amendments also propose an incentive method through
"milestones" which are set out with similar enforcement weight5 6 Con-
gress set out five new milestones in 1985 for the states, and set a target
of January 1, 1992 as the date to begin operating the new low-level
radioactive waste facilities.57
IV. FACILITY SITING AND THE PUBLIC
A. Public Participation and Low-Level Radioactive Waste Legislation
The 1980 LLRW Policy Act and the resulting interstate compacts
represent both federal and state recognition of low-level radioactive
waste problems and the need for facilities. However, it is crucial that
individual states obtain local amenability to facility sitings by improving
public understanding and increasing participation in siting decisions.
The success of the policies and processes established by the LLRW
Policy Act and the interstate compacts will ultimately depend on the
degree to which the public understands and participates in the host
state's facility siting. The societal benefits of strong citizen participation
were acknowledged by Alexis de Tocqueville in 1840: "As soon as a
man begins to treat public affairs in public, he begins to perceive that
he is not so independent of his fellow-men as he at first imagined, and
that, in order to obtain their support, he must often lend them his co-
operation."5 8
Interstate compact commissioners emphasize that the host state will
ultimately be responsible for siting the waste facility. 9 The public will
have little impact on the initial decision regarding which state within
a region will host the first facility.60 The public, however, must contribute
to the second step of the process-determining where, within the host
state, the facility will be sited. The public's role in this decision will
be similar to the role it presently plays in siting non-radioactive or toxic
55. LLRW Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 96-573, § 4(a)(2)(B), 94 Stat. 334 (1980)(codified
at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021d(c) (West Supp. 1987)).
56. The term "milestone" is used by Congress in the LLRW Policy Act to specify
dates by which certain requirements of the Act must be met. Enforcement of these
requirements is achieved by a system of surcharges and rebates.
57. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021e(e)(2)(D) (West Supp. 1987).
58. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 124-25 (F. Bowen ed. 1863).
59. Letter from Teri L. Vierima, Wisconsin Commissioner, Midwest Interstate Low
Level Radioactive Waste Commission (Nov. 5, 1986) (in response to letter) [hereinafter
Vierima Letter]; Letter from Robert M. Quillin, Ohio Commissioner, Midwest Interstate
Low Level Radioactive Waste Commission (Oct. 29, 1986) (in response to letter).
60. See Vierima Letter, supra note 59.
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waste disposal facilities. Consequently, conflicts found in non-radioactive
hazardous waste disposal facility sitings are analogous to those which
will specifically confront radioactive waste disposal sitings. Analysis of
hazardous waste conflicts and of attempts at resolving them are necessary
tools in examining and resolving contemporary problems in siting low-
level radioactive waste disposal facilities.
B. Current Public Participation in Toxic and Hazardous Waste Disposal
Facility Sitings
Disproportionate cost/benefit distributions have traditionally compli-
cated public participation in non-radioactive waste facility sitings as
reflected by the public's N.I.M.B.Y. orientation.61 The need to resolve
conflicts resulting from unequal but unavoidable costs distributions makes
alternative dispute mechanisms especially applicable. In many states,
negotiated siting agreements are already a recognized part of the process
for siting toxic waste disposal facilities. 62 In fact, toxic waste facility
siting is characterized as the "proving ground" for negotiation.63 Yet,
the role of the public in these negotiations is not to be understated:
"In no other area have citizen groups shown themselves to be so necessary
to ensuring protection of public health and the efficacy of government
progress than in this most controversial part of toxic waste controls." 64
Unfortunately, negotiation and mediation of facility sitings and other
environmental issues raises the difficult question of who represents the
"public interest." It also accenuates popular misconceptions that envi-
ronmental disputes are basically scientific disputes requiring impartial
referees. 65 Environmental mediation is also complicated by the potential
irreversibility of ecological damage caused by "wrong" decisions. 66
Effective public participation in environmental mediation further
complicates nuclear energy issues in three ways. First, standard economic
concerns must be balanced against traditional efficiency concerns and
non-traditional value judgments. Second, the technical nature of the
nuclear industry leads to scientific uncertainty and public distrust.
Finally, the public objection to nuclear energy is often based on ideology,
making negotiation difficult. Analyses of these three dilemmas are
61. S. MERNITZ, supra note 7, at 10. See supra text accompanying noie 26.
62. McGlennon, A Model Siting Process and the Role of Lawyers, 15 ENvTL. L.
Rav. 10239, 10240 (1985).
63. Anderson, Negotiation and Informal Agency Actiorn The Case of Superfund, 1985
DUKE L.J. 261, 328 n.248.
64. Hall, Keeping the EPA Vigilant: The Role of Private Watchdog Agencies, in
BEYOND DUMPING: NEW STRATEGIES FOR CONTROLLING TOXIC CONTAMINATION 27 (B.
Piasecki ed. 1984).
65. SUSSKIND & WEINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 324.
66. Id.
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necessary to determine the potential of reform of the present siting
process.
1. Economic Benefits and Environmental Risks. Obstacles to public
participation in low-level radioactive waste facility sitings are apparent
in an examination of the first conflict; the public's balancing of financial
burdens with efficiency concerns and value judgments. Burdens of a
low-level radioactive waste facility are concentrated in the vicinity of
the facility. These burdens include health and environmental risks from
accidents and improper operations, devaluation of nearby property, 67 and
the stigma associated with living near any type of hazardous waste
disposal facility.68 By contrast, benefits are spread over large regions,
even extending across state borders. Balancing these interests is ex-
ceedingly complex when viewed in light of public disagreements re-
garding value judgments and incompatible preferences for jobs, inexpensive
energy costs, clean air and water, and freedom from radiation leaks
and health risks.69
Without an alternative method of resolving disputes, the represen-
tational political system is poorly equipped to reach and resolve conflicts
which result when society's aggregate gain requires imposition of enor-
mous losses on a particular locality.70 The locality may obtain economic
benefits such as increased tax revenues, compensation payments to the
local community, and new jobs.7' However, widespread benefits are
publicly viewed as negligible in the locality where a facility is sited.
The interstate compacts agreed to under the LLRW Policy Act are
designed to mitigate the disadvantages present in this balancing dilemma.
For example, the Midwest Low Level Radioactive Waste Interstate
Compact Commission Draft Management Plan proposes incentives for
siting a facility by proposing that a "volunteer approach" be used to
designate a host state.72 The plan encourages a Midwest Compact State
to volunteer as the first host state, thereby qualifying for compensatory
financial bonuses.73 The plan also offers non-financial compensation by
allowing local control over the facility through a monitoring and review
committee. 74 The first host state could also benefit by a "National
Center for Low-Level Waste Management" located in the first host
state as a potential "international center of pre-eminent scientific and
educational activity. '75
67. See generally M. GREENBERG & R. ANDERSON, supra note 35.
68. Bacow & Milkey, supra note 25, at 268.
69. Id.
70. L. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY 11-12 (1980).
71. Bacow & Milkey, supra note 25, at 268.
72. Midwest Summary Report, supra note 18, at 57-58.
73. Id. at 58-59.
74. Id. at 59.
75. Id. at 59-60.
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Despite these compensatory proposals, problems persist in convincing
a state to host a facility. First, public perception of benefit to risk are
not always accurate. 76 Second, compensatory benefits are sometimes
viewed by the locality as bribes.77 Finally, differing value judgments
assign varying requirements on social costs. 78 Resolution of these dilem-
mas requires an emphasis on compensation as an incentive, not as a
substitute for adequate safety and health standards.79 Typically tax
revenue increases alone are insufficient incentives. Pro bono activities
may be necessary to negotiate a facility siting to prevent compensation
from becoming bribery. 80
2. Technological Nature of the Nuclear Industry. The second im-
pediment to public participation, technological complexity of the nuclear
industry, also relates to health and safety concerns. As discussed earlier,
scientific debate continues over safety in disposing of nuclear waste:
"Consistency among scientists has never been high with reference to
nuclear technology, and this has created special problems for radioactive
waste management."81 Thus, the public's attempts to balance health and
safety concerns with economic and social benefits are contingent upon
increasing "civic science literacy"--the increase in public understanding
of the technological and scientific issues. 82
Public misinformation, for example, presents an especially difficult
problem.83 The misconception exists that low-level radioactive waste is
generated solely from nuclear power plants. 84 This inaccuracy impedes
the Interstate Compact Commission's ability to use public comment,
"Where public participation is not based upon the facts, the Commission
may not have an opportunity to hear the true public sentiment."85
Recognizing that the Commission's "greatest challenge at this stage is
76. Bacow & Milkey, supra note 25, at 277.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Midwest Summary Report, supra note 18, at 57.
80. McGlennon, supra note 62, at 10239 n.1 ("There are distinguishable meanings
between compensation and bribe, and I prefer to refer to the exchange between an operator
and host community as compensation. The community is actually being compensated for
inconvenience or risk posed by the facility.")
81. Mileti & Williams, A Sociological Perspective on the Siting of Hasardous Waste
Facilities, in WASTE MANAGEMENT '85, WASTE ISOLATION IN THE U.S., TECHNICAL
PROGRAMS AND PUBLIC EDUCATION: Proceeding of the symposium on Waste Management
at Tucson, Arizona, Mar. 24-28, 1985, at 72.
82. Shen, Science Literacy and the Public Understanding of Science, in COMMUNI-
CATION OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION 48 (S. Day ed. 1975).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 16-25.
84. Id.
85. Letter from Joseph H. Snyder, Director, Indiana Hazardous Waste Facility Site
Approval Authority (Nov. 5, 1986) (in response to letter).
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public education,"86 most interstate compacts include programs simrlar
to the Midwest Compact's "Public Information/Participation Program,"
which work to educate the public. The technical complexity conflict
may also be minimized by confrontation of public misconceptions in
two unique alternative dispute mechanisms-the Citizens Board and the
Science Court, discussed later in this Note.87
3. Ideological Dilemmas. The third barrier to public participation is
an ideological conflict created by tension between the utility company-
government "pro-nuclear" side of the nuclear energy conflict and the
antinuclear "watchdog" side of the conflict. The public perception of
pro-nuclear groups' "agency arrogance, expert elitism, and stacked-deck
proceedings" is counter-balanced by perceptions of antinuclear groups'
'know-nothingism', blind anti-technology and anti-government
sentiments.... '88
A comparison of these two interest groups shows that both are
somewhat equal in strength, cohesiveness, relative ideological perspec-
tives, and communication networks.8 9 The groups, however, differ as to
the strength of their leadership. The antinuclear groups have more
visible, publicity-intense leaders, while the nuclear industry has failed
to produce strong leaders.90
The relative strengths of these interest groups vary in the context in
which they operate. In administrative hearings for facility sitings, an-
tinuclear groups are less influential since they direct objections toward
nuclear activities generating radioactive waste, not disposal. Conse-
quently, in low-level facility siting decisions, the nuclear interest group
has a much greater impact.
These three impediments to public participation, inadequate balancing
of interests, uninformed technological views of the nuclear industry, and
persistent ideological conflicts, make low-level radioactive waste facility
sitings ideal for reformation through alternative dispute mechanisms.
Reform of the present system is necessary in light of the negative
attitude expressed toward the public's role in siting of nuclear power
plants, "[t]he cult of public participation in nuclear power licensing-
which is in reality a sham...has been used by the establishment to give
legitimacy and the appearance of credibility..... 91 Changes must be
made.
86. Vierima Letter, supra note 59.
87. See infra text accompanying notes 93-105.
88. S. EBBIN & R. KASPER, CITIZEN GROUPS AND THE NUCLEAR POWER CONTRO-
VERSY: USES OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL INFORMATION 4 (1974).
89. C. COOK, NUCLEAR POWER AND LEGAL ADVOCACY 9-24 (1980).
90. Id.
91. Green, Federal Regulation and Impact of Health and Safety 17, Transcript of
Proceedings of the Conference on Legal Consequences of Nuclear Accidents and Shut-
downs, July 27-28, 1979, Published by PENN. L.J.
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V. IMPROVING PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE
FACILITY SITING PROCESS
Reform may be sought through both institutional and non-institutional
means. Non-institutional reforms include alternative dispute mechanisms
outside current statutory structures, for example, a Citizens Board or
Science Court.9 2 Institutional reforms consist of alternative dispute mech-
anisms formalizing public participation through statutes, or by relying
on traditional spokespersons in a locality, such as city council members.
A. Non-Institutional Reform
Non-institutional reform is presently used to enlarge the public's role
in various technologically-laden disputes requiring public participation.
The Citizens Board and Science Court are two examples of this technique.
The Citizens Board was first used in 1976 in the siting of a recom-
binant-DNA laboratory in Cambridge, Massachusetts. 93 The laboratory
siting sparked debate over the safety of DNA research in a densely
populated area - a conflict similar to hazardous waste facility sitings
in their locality-specific costs and N.I.M.B.Y. public perceptions. 94 An
Experimentation Review Board was established, consisting of nine non-
expert citizens appointed by the city manager. The Review Board was
given advisory authority in the laboratory siting decision.
The Review Board was successful, establishing credibility with the
community and resolving issues based on scientific merits and value
decisions. However, the major problem with the Board was the education
of its members on the technical information pertinent to the dispute.
The education level of individual panel members appeared irrelevant to
the problem of obtaining an understanding of the technical aspects of
the discussion. However, the enormous amount of time needed for
members to familiarize themselves with the problem proved to be a
factor in the members' ability to understand the issue.9 5
These limitations on the Review Board's time and scientific training
suggests a Science Court as an alternative procedure. This alternative
dispute technique has traditionally been used by the FDA to gain
expertise on a variety of complex scientific issues. 96 For example, Con-
92. See infra text accompanying notes 93-105.
93. Krimsky, A Citizen Court in the Recombinant DNA Controversy, 34 BULLETIN
OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 37-43 (Oct. 1978).
94. Id. at 42-43.
95. Id. at 39-43.
96. Dormer, Use of Advisory Committees by the Food and Drug Administration
Under the Medical Device Amendments, 40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 103 (1985). See
generally O'Brien, The Courts & Science-Policy Disputes: A Review & Commentary on
the Role of the Judiciary in Regulatory Politics, 4 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 81 (1983).
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gress made such scientific advisory committees a mandatory part of
FDA regulation in the Medical Device Amendments of 1976.97 Appl-
icability of the Science Court technique to the low-level radioactive
waste dilemma is demonstrated by the Administrative Conference of
the United States' promulgation of section 310.11 in 1985.98 The Con-
ference made procedural recommendations for resolving scientific issues,
and noted that agencies depending on scientific determinations, such as
the Environmental Protection Agency, should consider using a science
advisory board to resolve conflicts. 99
The purpose of the Science Court, as an institutionalized forum, is
to provide scientific, empirical judgments to policy makers through an
adversarial process. 00 The Science Court is composed of scientist-judges
who examine issues based on scientific merit by screening out evidence
and setting up norms of science. Due to its factual nature, the Science
Court is less prone to intimidation by "experts" since they are the
experts. The Science Court also investigates more forcefully and effec-
tively into complex scientific conflicts.' 0'
The danger of a Science Court can be serious in the potential for
members of the Court to divorce factual issues from policy and value
decisions. Disputes based on factual dilemmas may be oversimplified
by the Science Court, thereby masking value-laden decisions from policy-
makers.10 2 Also, by allowing a Science Court to make such decisions,
the public may be threatened by the Court as a mechanism usurping
the role of public participation by being, "directed more toward co-
opting public support then changing decisions; more toward seeking
informed consent than expanding democratic choice."' 13
Consequently, the Citizens Board appears to be more conducive to
protecting the public's role in policy decisions since, in addition to the
dangers of a technological fix, other conditions may be present making
the Science Court less attractive as an alternative dispute mechanism.
For example, the Science Court might prove disadvantageous when the
political climate creates an appearance of self-interest, or where the
jury of scientists considers the impact of its decision on the growth of
university research. Additionally, in situations involving government
97. Id. The Canadian government adopted a similar alternative dispute mechanism in
1969, breaking with tradition by using a science court in the LeDain inquiry into the
non-medical use of drugs. See Salter, The Role of the Public in Scientific Determination
of Policy: The Canadian Inquiry Process, 31 U. TORONTO L.J. 343 (1981).
98. 50 Fed. Reg. 52896 (1985) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 310.11).
99. Id.
100. Krimsky, supra note 93, at 46.
101. Id. at 42.
102. Nelkin & Pollak, Public Participation in Technological Decisions: Reality or
Grand Illusion? 1979 TECH. REv. 55, 61 (1983).
103. Id. at 63.
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regulation, scientists may fear setting precedents with the potential to
affect their own interests. Finally, in decisions where technology and
policy are inseparable, scientists may define the problem too narrowly
and thus disregard integral social and value implications. 4 In light of
its potential for establishing credibility with the community, the Citizens
Board could be adapted in state facility sitings for low-level radioactive
waste, provided intensive educational programs are available to supple-
ment the Citizens Board's activities. 0 5
B. Institutional Reform
Deciding whether to institutionalize reform by requiring public par-
ticipation by statute or through local ordinance, turns on the resolution
of the following questions:
1. To what degree should the state and a local community share
power?
2. What governmental body should exercise local authority (city or
county government or both)?
3. Within that body, what unit-legislative (city council) or executive
(mayor)-has primary authority?
4. Should the state have preemptive rights over the locality (the
home rule conflict)?10 6
Institutionalizing public participation by state statute would provide
cohesiveness in establishing improved public participation in facility
siting since states presently control the siting process through compre-
hensive statutory procedures. 07 Low-level radioactive waste facility sit-
ings must be determined according to the needs of each individual state,
and also according to the needs of the interstate compact region to
which a state may belong. Therefore, altering the process of facility
siting at the state level by institutionalizing public participation in state
statutes would legitimize public participation and make the decision
more acceptable to the public. 08
Providing for statutory public participation in facility siting decisions
could take six different forms:
104. Krimsky, supra note 93, at 43.
105. Id. at 39 n.10, citing Federow, Recombinant DNA in Cambridge: Lessons for
Nuclear Energy, Occasional Paper, Sept. 1977, the Institute for Energy analysis, Oak
Ridge, Tenn: shorter version in BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 6-7 (Feb. 1978).
106. D. MORELL & C. MAGORIAN, supra note 22, at 101.
107. T. SULLIvAN, NEGOTIATION-BASED REVIEW PROCESSES FOR FACILITY SITING 32
(Jan. 1980) (unpublished Ph.D Dissertation) (available Harvard University Library).
108. Id. at 33.
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1. Minimum formal participation (nonadjudicatory hearings);
2. Enhanced formal public participation (public involvement at earlier
stages);
3. Enhanced formal participation in a process preceding regulatory
decisions (advance distribution of documents, notice...);
4. Formal due process (adjudicatory hearing);
5. Direct electoral participation (initiative and referendum);
6. Interest representation in alternative dispute
proceedings (mediation/negotiation/arbitration). 10 9
These methods of institutionalizing public participation differ as to
when the participation occurs and the extent to which the public
materially affects the proceedings. Generally, the earlier the public
participates in facility siting decisions, the more likely citizens will
accept the final determination. This early impact is required to prevent
public influence from being preempted from the facility siting process." 0
The first four forms of institutionalization above are presently used
in hazardous waste facility sitings. However, there are numerous ways
of improving this process. The following section examines the potential
for institutional reforms in the current process. Such reforms include
the initiative and referendum, mitigation of home rule, and a restruc-
turing of the siting process through implementation of a negotiation-
based system.
1. Initiative, Referendum, and Petition. The initiative method defines
the process through which citizens use petitions to initiate consideration
of alternative siting agreements in addition to those already under
consideration at a hearing. Although the initiative reform allows citizens
to exert influence in initial stages of the siting process, it fails to prevent
preemption of the public in subsequent stages."'
The referendum offers an alternative reform, as demonstrated by the
South Dakota State Legislature which implemented referendum approval
of its interstate compact in 1985. Public participation was legitimized
as part of the state's low-level radioactive waste disposal policy." 2 The
South Dakota legislature enacted a statute reserving to state residents
the exclusive right to approve or reject South Dakota's entry into an
interstate compact for low-level radioactive waste disposal." 3 This al-
ternative mechanism was upheld by the South Dakota Supreme Court
109. Tarlock, supra note 1, at 24-25. The sixth form of institutionalization of public
participation refers to the total reformation discussed infra at text accompanting notes
121-40.
110. Preemption occurs when decisions are made prior to or without public comment
or participation.
I11. Tarlock, supra note 1, at 24-25.
112. Wyatt v. Kundert, 375 N.W.2d 186 (S.D. 1985).
113. Id. at 189.
[Vol. 3:1 1987]
WASTE DISPOSAL FACILITY SITINGS
as a valid exercise of legislative authority, albeit limited to the one-
time use for approval of the Dakota Interstate Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Management Compact. The court ruled, however, that the statute
would be unconstitutional if used as an automatic legislative or electorate
referral of all enactments involving nuclear waste disposal ."4
The petition offers an alternative method of reform. Since public
participation in hazardous waste facility siting hearings usually consists
of comments from individual citizens, special interest groups, and ide-
ologically based citizens' groups, a petition mechanism could be imple-
mented allowing for more effective input. The procedure allows recognition
of groups by requiring a set number of signatures as a prerequisite for
participation."' At the very least, this could help ensure broad-based
public interest representation and would minimize the perception of
public preemption. It would also improve the effectiveness of non-
ideologically based citizens' groups by giving them an opportunity to
participate." 16
2. Mitigation of Home Rule. Halting mitigation of home rule offers
another method for reforming facility siting procedures, as it protects
local controls over the siting process. In the past, communities have
passed local ordinances prohibiting the siting of low-level radioactive
waste facilities in their area."f7 The recent hazardous waste facility siting
controversy compels states to mitigate their extensions of home rule by
passing laws preempting these local ordinances." 8 As of 1981, 16 of 25
states with hazardous waste facility siting statutes had preemptory
provisions." 9 Although preemption of the public could occur with a
reduction in home rule, the preemptory statutes as they exist today do
not totally preclude public participation by the local community. Many
states mitigate preemption with provisions allowing for limited local
control. Michigan, for example, requires that the state approval board
integrate local regulations into the siting decision "to the fullest extent
practicable"; Oregon requires local land use approval before permit
application; and Rhode Island mandates negotiation with a local as-
sessment committee before siting. 120
Although mitigation of home rule limits local control, state legislatures
recognize the need to prevent total preemption of the public. Conse-
114. Id. at 192.
115. L. BACOW & M. WHEELER, supra note 11, at 112.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 88-91.
117. D. MORELL & C. MAGORIAN, supra note 22, at 49.
118. Id.
119. Bacow & Milkey, supra note 25, at 270.
120. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 299.520(8) (Supp. 1981). See also Taylor, The
Status of Off-Site Toxic Substance Disposal Facility Siting, Paper presented at the National
Conference on Hazardous Wastes and Environmental Emergencies 95, 95-97 (May 14-
16, 1983).
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quently, this trend toward mitigating home rule will not necessarily
prove detrimental to the public since participation on a statewide level
may still be enhanced through other reforms. Therefore, easing the
trend toward mitigation does not provide the most productive means
toward institutionalizing reform.
Public participation can be improved through alternative dispute
methods such as the initiative, referendum, and petition, and by halting
home rule mitigation. Restructuring the entire facility siting process,
however, would provide the comprehensive changes needed to signifi-
cantly improve public participation.
C. Restructuring Facility Sitings and Public Participation
Recognizing the need to totally restructure the facility siting process
to enhance public participation, Timothy John Sullivan, in his unpub-
lished thesis "Negotiation-Based Review Processes for Facility Siting,"
examines three currently available systems for siting hazardous waste
facilities: (1) the administrative system presently in use, (2) an auction
system, and (3) a negotiation system.12' The latter is recommended for
implementation by Sullivan and by this Note. 122
Presently, facility sitings are made through regulatory agencies which
review and approve proposed facility plans and sites. 23 Multiple layers
of the current administrative-governmental model rarely provide for
constructive public participation since public comment usually occurs
late in the proceedings and has little effect on final decisions. 24 Con-
sequently, citizens exit such proceedings disillusioned due to a perception
of being co-opted and compromised. 25 Mechanisms discussed previously,
such as the Citizens Boards and statutory formalization of public par-
ticipation could be used to improve this system.126
By contrast, the auction system requires each locality to submit a
bid in the amount the locality requires as compensation for providing
a site. 27 The developer then chooses, creating a market system for
facility siting. 28 The compensatory aspects of this system mirror the
incentives plan of the Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Commission Summary Report, however, restrictions are needed to pre-
121. T. SULLIVAN, supra note 107, at 52-60.
122. Id. at 60.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 59-61.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27 & 58-60.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 93-105.
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vent compromising health and safety concerns for financial gains. 129
Although public participation in such a method could be substantial as
control over the facility siting would return to the locality, the dangers
of compromising safety for cost efficiency make this plan neither viable
nor likely as an alternative to the present administrative system. 30
Using the mechanisms of environmental mediation and negotiation,
the third alternative appears most workable in view of the comprehen-
siveness of the system. The procedure requires developers, government,
and sub-governmental groups to join in negotiating issues crucial to
facility sitings, including technological surveys, tax assessments, miti-
gation efforts, and local compensation.'13
1. Codification of a Negotiation-Based Facility Siting Process. The
Negotiation-Based Facility Siting Process would be established through
state statutes as a formal mechanism for communication between de-
velopers and public interest opponents. 3 2 This Note proposes modification
of Sullivan's model for the Negotiation-Based Review Process in order
to accommodate the unique requirements of low-level radioactive waste
facility sitings. First, the statutory scheme would mandate negotiation
of sitings relative to project design, local compensation, and methods
of mitigating project impact.'33 Second, mandatory participation by the
developer and government agencies, and an automatic petition process
would be used to identify community and special interest group partic-
ipants. 3 4 Third, mediation techniques would be used to prevent bar-
gaining breakdowns by empowering a mediator to choose an agenda,
assist in communications, and use facts to deflate extreme positions and
obtain formal endorsement of agreements.' 35 Fourth, formal deadlines
would be implemented, along with compensatory and incentive mech-
anisms. 36 These provisions would have enforcement authority analogous
to that of the LLRW Policy Act and Amendment milestones, and similar
to those found in the Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Commission Summary Report's "Volunteer Plan" for the host state
129. Midwest Summary Report, supra note 18. See also supra text accompanying
notes 67-80.
130. T. SULLIVAN, supra note 107, at 74-76.
131. Id. at 60.
132. Id. at 77.
133. Id. at 282.
134. Id. at 283.
135. Id. at 276.
136. Id. at 284.
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decision. 37 Finally, a referendum procedure would be enacted allowing
for local approval or rejection of the final agreement.'
This last provision reflects the state-wide referendum procedure ap-
proved by the South Dakota Supreme Court in Wyatt v. Kundert.39
Since the court failed to approve the referendum as an institutionalized
procedure, a referendum provision allowing for local approval of every
facility siting agreement would likely be viewed by state courts as an
unconstitutional delegation to local citizens of a power which the state
legislature cannot extend to all citizens. 40 Acceptance of this mechanism
is contingent upon a state's constitution, and whether the referendum
provision is interpreted as initiating a "new" referendum each time it
is used, or whether the statute-based proposal is viewed as an institu-
tionalized referendum, thus making it an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority.
The negotiation-based proposal resolves many problems presently lim-
iting public impact on siting hazardous waste facilities. One problem it
does not confront, however, is public uncertainty caused by ambiguous
and confusing information. Therefore, an institutionalized public infor-
mation program is necessary to combat this unique problem.
2. Public Information Supplementation of a Negotiation-Based Model
for Facility Siting. A public information program would educate citizens
resulting in a more realistic public perception of the risks of radioactive
waste disposal. A workable and effective program should meet three
criteria. First, the source of public information must be credible.' 4' This
could be achieved, ostensibly, through modified use of a Science Court. 42
Second, information must be consistent in tone, in content, and presented
in a timely and accurate manner. 43 Clarification of technical information
without oversimplifying may be achieved through openness in risk pro-
jections, thus preventing the public perception of being "held out" on.' 44
Finally, public information should be provided regularly or with advance
notice, using a variety of channels to achieve the widest dissemination
of materials. 45
This public information system would enlarge the role of the public
by improving citizens' abilities to realistically balance competing costs
and benefits complicating the siting process. Ultimately, this would
137. See supra text accompanying notes 72-75.
138. T. SULLIVAN, supra note 107, at 283.
139. 375 N.W.2d 186 (S.D. 1985).
140. Id. at 192.
141. Mileti & Williams, supra note 81, at 72.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 98-105.
143. Mileti & Williams, supra note 81, at 72.
144. Id.
145. Vierima Letter, supra note 59.
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legitimize public participation, making it more effective from the per-
spective of citizens, land developers, and government officials.
VI. CONCLUSION
Statistics demonstrating participation at nuclear waste disposal facility
siting meetings "suggest a trend away from disproportional participation
by experts, nuclear industry, and the federal government and toward
greater participation by individuals, citizens groups, and state and local
government officials." 146 As states begin to implement the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Interstate Compacts, legislators should recognize and
attempt to counteract public fears of preemption by providing a more
effective role for public participation through reformed siting procedures.
Improvements to current procedures could be implemented through
alternative dispute mechanisms such as Citizens Boards, Science Courts,
and public information programs. In the alternative, this Note recom-
mends a comprehensive restructuring of state siting processes using a
Negotiation-Based Review Process. Using the discussed procedures, a
state can aid interstate compact commissions in resolving the low-level
radioactive waste disposal crisis by establishing and legitimizing a role
for the public in siting decisions.
As one Midwest Interstate Low Level Radioactive Waste Commis-
sioner warns, "We have a relatively short time in which to accomplish
a great deal of education before a productive dialogue can take place.
The federal milestones we are up against are very strict... [and] ...public
participation is a critical element in any siting plan."1 47 Responsibility
for siting a facility rests with the state not with the interstate compact
commission. Thus, states must accept responsibility for low-level radio-
active waste management by formulating effective intra-state programs
which recognize and enhance the public's role in low-level radioactive
waste facility sitings.
Katherine R. Shanabrook
146. Marcus, Analysis of Participation at Nuclear Waste Meetings: The Representation
of Divergent Concerns, 2 RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT. 363, 370-71 (June 1982).
147. Vierima Letter, supra note 59.
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